ToneShell Backdoor GUID Store SystemRuntimeLag.inc in ProgramData (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-12
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the SystemRuntimeLag.inc file that the Frankenstein ToneShell variant writes under ProgramData to store its per-host victim GUID. This uniquely named artifact is not associated with legitimate software and marks the backdoor recording its infection state.

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ToneShell Backdoor GUID Store SystemRuntimeLag.inc in ProgramData (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.