UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll via DllHost.exe (File Events)
Flags file events where Temp\OskSupport.dll is targeted alongside DllHost.exe and Windows Media Player\osk.exe, consistent with a UAC bypass attempt.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
uac-bypass-using-windows-media-player-osksupport-dll-via-dllhost-exe-file-events-68578b43
title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll via DllHost.exe (File Events)
id: cbaa0ba0-73a8-4bec-b67b-8efddc192c66
status: test
description: This rule matches file-write or file-creation activity consistent with a UAC bypass workflow that uses Windows Media Player components. It looks for a target path under the current user Temp directory ending with OskSupport.dll, combined with DllHost.exe spawning or being associated with C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe. This matters because abusing these Windows binaries can enable elevation attempts that bypass user access controls. The detection relies on file event telemetry capturing the target file path and the involved process image path.
references:
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_uac_bypass_wmp.yml
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Users\
TargetFilename|endswith: \AppData\Local\Temp\OskSupport.dll
selection2:
Image: C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe
TargetFilename: C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 68578b43-65df-4f81-9a9b-92f32711a951
type: derived
What it detects
This rule matches file-write or file-creation activity consistent with a UAC bypass workflow that uses Windows Media Player components. It looks for a target path under the current user Temp directory ending with OskSupport.dll, combined with DllHost.exe spawning or being associated with C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe. This matters because abusing these Windows binaries can enable elevation attempts that bypass user access controls. The detection relies on file event telemetry capturing the target file path and the involved process image path.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.