UpdateRetriever Beacon Execution from LocalAppData in Fake Converter Campaign (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-06
Updated
2026-11-06

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Defense Evasion

  5. Cred Access

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of UpdateRetriever.exe from a LocalAppData subdirectory, the second-stage .NET beacon installed by the fake file-converter malvertising ecosystem and run through a recurring scheduled task. Adversaries leverage this generic assembly-execution engine to fetch and run payloads on demand, making detection useful for catching persistence and command-and-control staging.

Related detections9 linkedT1053.005 — drag to rearrange
Masquerading XWorm Persistence via MicrosoftVisualUpdater Scheduled Task (via process_creation)
HttpSpy Scheduled Task Persistence via Regsvr32 (via process_creation)
Suspicious Matanbuchus Persistence via Update Tracker Task Scheduled Task (via process_creation)
Suspicious CoffeeLoader Persistence via AsusUpdateServiceUA Scheduled Task (via process_creation)
Office Applications Loading taskschd.dll via ImageLoad (Windows Scheduled Tasks COM)
Suspicious Per-Minute Scheduled Task Creation via schtasks for GOVERSHELL Persistence
Suspicious Scheduled Task Running WScript With JScript Engine
Suspicious SUNBURST EventCacheManager Scheduled Task Artifact (via process_creation)
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Running VBS at One Minute Interval via Blind Eagle (via process_creation)
UpdateRetriever Beacon Execution from LocalAppData in Fake Converter Campaign (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.