Windows Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys Creation in Local Temp Folder
Flags creation of PROCEXP152.sys in AppData\Local\Temp, excluding events from common Sysinternals executables.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_event
- Author
- xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2019-04-08
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file specifically when it is written under the local application-data temporary directory path and the filename ends with PROCEXP152.sys. Attackers may use the same driver filename associated with Sysinternals Process Explorer, or similar tooling that relies on PROCEXP152.sys to interact with process activity. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the target filename path and the creating process image.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Suspicious PROCEXP152.sys Creation in Local Temp Folder
id: 665ab2d4-bf80-4110-851b-7d155bc9d536
status: test
description: This rule flags creation of the PROCEXP152.sys file specifically when it is written under the local application-data temporary directory path and the filename ends with PROCEXP152.sys. Attackers may use the same driver filename associated with Sysinternals Process Explorer, or similar tooling that relies on PROCEXP152.sys to interact with process activity. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the target filename path and the creating process image.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_procexplorer_driver_created_in_tmp_folder.yml
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
TargetFilename|endswith: PROCEXP152.sys
filter:
Image|contains:
- \procexp64.exe
- \procexp64a.exe
- \procexp.exe
- \procmon64.exe
- \procmon64a.exe
- \procmon.exe
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Other legimate tools using this driver and filename (like Sysinternals). Note - Clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the driver filename. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 3da70954-0f2c-4103-adff-b7440368f50e
type: derived