Windows baaupdate.exe Suspicious DLL Loads from Publicly Writable Paths
Alerts when BaaUpdate.exe loads DLLs from Temp/Public-type locations associated with DLL search hijacking risk.
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windows-baaupdate-exe-suspicious-dll-loads-from-publicly-writable-paths-6e8fe0a8
title: Windows baaupdate.exe Suspicious DLL Loads from Publicly Writable Paths
id: 250c74f1-4081-4887-bb0b-bb55c4de872a
related:
- id: 9f38c1db-e2ae-40bf-81d0-5b68f73fb512
type: similar
- id: 6e8fe0a8-ba0b-4a93-8f9e-82657e7a5984
type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags instances where BaaUpdate.exe loads a DLL whose path ends in .dll and matches common publicly writable locations (e.g., Temp, Public, Users Default). Attackers may abuse this behavior to load malicious libraries in place of legitimate DLLs, potentially enabling code execution during the utility’s operation. The detection relies on image load telemetry that records the loading process image name and the full path of the DLL being loaded.
references:
- https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/BitlockMove
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_baaupdate_dll_load.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-10-18
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.003
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \BaaUpdate.exe
ImageLoaded|endswith: .dll
ImageLoaded|contains:
- :\Perflogs\
- :\Users\Default\
- :\Users\Public\
- :\Windows\Temp\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \AppData\Roaming\
- \Contacts\
- \Favorites\
- \Favourites\
- \Links\
- \Music\
- \Pictures\
- \ProgramData\
- \Temporary Internet
- \Videos\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags instances where BaaUpdate.exe loads a DLL whose path ends in .dll and matches common publicly writable locations (e.g., Temp, Public, Users Default). Attackers may abuse this behavior to load malicious libraries in place of legitimate DLLs, potentially enabling code execution during the utility’s operation. The detection relies on image load telemetry that records the loading process image name and the full path of the DLL being loaded.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.