Windows cmd.exe Reads Input from STDIN Using '<' Redirection
Flags cmd.exe invocations with '<' in the command line, indicating stdin/input redirection.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-03-07
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creations where cmd.exe is launched with a command line containing the '<' redirection operator. Such usage can indicate reading data or redirecting input from a file, which may be leveraged to run or influence commands indirectly. It relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the image name/path and the full command line containing '<'.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
- web.archive.orghttps://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_stdin_redirect.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows cmd.exe Reads Input from STDIN Using '<' Redirection
id: 21fe1239-2ebb-4576-9b0b-b96ab7ce40f8
related:
- id: 00a4bacd-6db4-46d5-9258-a7d5ebff4003
type: obsolete
- id: 241e802a-b65e-484f-88cd-c2dc10f9206d
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creations where cmd.exe is launched with a command line containing the '<' redirection operator. Such usage can indicate reading data or redirecting input from a file, which may be leveraged to run or influence commands indirectly. It relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the image name/path and the full command line containing '<'.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1059.003/T1059.003.md
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220306121156/https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=ntdll_pipe
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_stdin_redirect.yml
author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-03-07
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmd:
- OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe
- Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: <
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1