Windows CMD for /f Tokens= with Recursive Dir Listing

Flags cmd.exe for /f loops using tokens= with recursive dir enumeration in the command line and parent.

FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1

windows-cmd-for-f-tokens-with-recursive-dir-listing-2782fbd8

title: Windows CMD for /f Tokens= with Recursive Dir Listing
id: b7cc34a9-c828-4522-a6c5-afee9cac05c7
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process creation events where cmd.exe command lines include a for /f loop with tokens= and an in ( dir ... ) style recursive directory listing pattern. Such command-line composition can be used to dynamically enumerate files and drive subsequent actions, which is a common step in stealthy execution chains. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing the full command line for both the process and its parent.
references:
  - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/29837d0d3202758063185828c8f8d9e0b7b42b365c8941cc926d2d7c7bae2fb3
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cmd_for_loop_execution_with_recursive_directory_search.yml
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-11-12
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1027.010
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_tokens:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - for /f
      - tokens=
      - in (
      - dir
  selection_tokens_parent:
    ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
      - for /f
      - tokens=
      - in (
      - dir
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 2782fbd8-b662-4eb5-9962-5bfbfb671e7b
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where cmd.exe command lines include a for /f loop with tokens= and an in ( dir ... ) style recursive directory listing pattern. Such command-line composition can be used to dynamically enumerate files and drive subsequent actions, which is a common step in stealthy execution chains. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing the full command line for both the process and its parent.

Known false positives

Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.