Windows curl.exe Execution Using TOR SOCKS Proxy (SOCKS and .onion in Command Line)
Alerts on Windows curl.exe being run with Tor SOCKS proxy URIs and .onion targets in the command line.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-curl-exe-execution-using-tor-socks-proxy-socks-and-onion-in-command-line-e99375eb
title: Windows curl.exe Execution Using TOR SOCKS Proxy (SOCKS and .onion in Command Line)
id: 173dfd3a-a09a-4562-9e3c-4e5917dfeae6
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process executions where curl.exe is launched with command-line arguments indicating use of a SOCKS proxy for Tor (SOCKS URI schemes such as socks5h://, socks5://, or socks4a://) and also references a .onion destination. Such behavior matters because attackers can route outbound communications through anonymity networks for command-and-control or data exfiltration. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching both the executable path ending with curl.exe and specific substrings in the command line.
references:
- https://blog.eclecticiq.com/sandworm-apt-targets-ukrainian-users-with-trojanized-microsoft-kms-activation-tools-in-cyber-espionage-campaigns
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Malware/proc_creation_win_malware_kalambur_curl_socks_tor.yml
author: Arda Buyukkaya (EclecticIQ), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-02-11
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1573
- attack.t1071.001
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.s0183
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith: \curl.exe
selection_socks:
CommandLine|contains:
- socks5h://
- socks5://
- socks4a://
selection_onion:
CommandLine|contains: .onion
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e99375eb-3ee0-407a-9f90-79569cc6a01c
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags process executions where curl.exe is launched with command-line arguments indicating use of a SOCKS proxy for Tor (SOCKS URI schemes such as socks5h://, socks5://, or socks4a://) and also references a .onion destination. Such behavior matters because attackers can route outbound communications through anonymity networks for command-and-control or data exfiltration. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching both the executable path ending with curl.exe and specific substrings in the command line.
Known false positives
- Unlikely
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.