Windows: Detect Run dialog command history in RunMRU registry
Flags suspicious Run dialog command entries by matching RunMRU registry key updates on Windows.
FreeUnreviewedSigmalowv1
windows-detect-run-dialog-command-history-in-runmru-registry-f9d091f6
title: "Windows: Detect Run dialog command history in RunMRU registry"
id: 14e94130-a19c-420f-ae2f-1f8aaa78aa7c
related:
- id: a7df0e9e-91a5-459a-a003-4cde67c2ff5d
type: derived
- id: f9d091f6-f1c7-4873-a24f-050b4a02b4dd
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule detects entries related to commands executed through the Windows Run dialog by monitoring the RunMRU registry key path. Attackers may leverage this execution pathway to get users to run attacker-supplied commands, leaving command history artifacts in the registry. The detection relies on registry set telemetry capturing the TargetObject path and command-related Details values.
references:
- https://www.forensafe.com/blogs/runmrukey.html
- https://medium.com/@shaherzakaria8/downloading-trojan-lumma-infostealer-through-capatcha-1f25255a0e71
- https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-october-2024/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_runmru_command_execution.yml
author: Ahmed Farouk, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-11-01
tags:
- detection.threat-hunting
- attack.execution
logsource:
product: windows
category: registry_set
detection:
selection:
TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
filter_main_mrulist:
TargetObject|endswith: \MRUList
filter_optional_ping:
Details|contains: ping
filter_optional_generic:
Details:
- "%appdata%\\1"
- "%localappdata%\\1"
- "%public%\\1"
- "%temp%\\1"
- calc\1
- dxdiag\1
- explorer\1
- gpedit.msc\1
- mmc\1
- notepad\1
- regedit\1
- services.msc\1
- winver\1
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Likely
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule detects entries related to commands executed through the Windows Run dialog by monitoring the RunMRU registry key path. Attackers may leverage this execution pathway to get users to run attacker-supplied commands, leaving command history artifacts in the registry. The detection relies on registry set telemetry capturing the TargetObject path and command-related Details values.
Known false positives
- Likely
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.