Windows DLL Sideloading via comctl32.dll in .local directories
Alerts on comctl32.dll loaded from System32 .local folders, consistent with Windows DLL sideloading.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- image_load
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-12-16
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags DLL loads where comctl32.dll is accessed from a .local subdirectory under specific Windows executables (e.g., logonUI.exe.local, werFault.exe.local, consent.exe.local). Loading a DLL from an executable-relative location can enable side-loading and may facilitate privilege escalation by redirecting which library instance is used. It relies on image load telemetry, specifically the loaded module path matching the targeted .local locations and ending with comctl32.dll.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
- github.comhttps://github.com/sailay1996/awesome_windows_logical_bugs/blob/60cbb23a801f4c3195deac1cc46df27c225c3d07/dir_create2system.txt
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_comctl32.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows DLL Sideloading via comctl32.dll in .local directories
id: f06463b8-c359-4123-a1fc-325994989c5a
status: test
description: This rule flags DLL loads where comctl32.dll is accessed from a .local subdirectory under specific Windows executables (e.g., logonUI.exe.local, werFault.exe.local, consent.exe.local). Loading a DLL from an executable-relative location can enable side-loading and may facilitate privilege escalation by redirecting which library instance is used. It relies on image load telemetry, specifically the loaded module path matching the targeted .local locations and ending with comctl32.dll.
references:
- https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System
- https://github.com/sailay1996/awesome_windows_logical_bugs/blob/60cbb23a801f4c3195deac1cc46df27c225c3d07/dir_create2system.txt
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_comctl32.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Subhash Popuri (@pbssubhash), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-16
modified: 2022-12-19
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- C:\Windows\System32\logonUI.exe.local\
- C:\Windows\System32\werFault.exe.local\
- C:\Windows\System32\consent.exe.local\
- C:\Windows\System32\narrator.exe.local\
- C:\windows\system32\wermgr.exe.local\
ImageLoaded|endswith: \comctl32.dll
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 6360757a-d460-456c-8b13-74cf0e60cceb
type: derived