Windows DLL sideloading suspicion via image load of JsSchHlp DLL

Alerts on unexpected loads of \JSESPR.dll, indicating possible DLL sideloading outside the Justsystem JsSchHlp directory.

FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
title: Windows DLL sideloading suspicion via image load of JsSchHlp DLL
id: 34d7869c-9343-48d0-8ebb-c7eb248db864
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows image loads where the loaded DLL name ends with '\JSESPR.dll' but is not loaded from the expected Justsystem JsSchHlp installation directory. Attackers may sideload a malicious DLL to hijack execution flow of a trusted component, enabling persistence or privilege escalation. The detection relies on image load telemetry, specifically the loaded DLL path and filename from image_load events.
references:
  - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/12/14/unmasking-mirrorface-operation-liberalface-targeting-japanese-political-entities/
  - http://www.windowexe.com/bbs/board.php?q=jsschhlp-exe-c-program-files-common-files-justsystem-jsschhlp-jsschhlp
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_jsschhlp.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-14
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1574.001
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ImageLoaded|endswith: \JSESPR.dll
  filter:
    ImageLoaded|startswith: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Justsystem\JsSchHlp\
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 68654bf0-4412-43d5-bfe8-5eaa393cd939
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags Windows image loads where the loaded DLL name ends with '\JSESPR.dll' but is not loaded from the expected Justsystem JsSchHlp installation directory. Attackers may sideload a malicious DLL to hijack execution flow of a trusted component, enabling persistence or privilege escalation. The detection relies on image load telemetry, specifically the loaded DLL path and filename from image_load events.

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.