Windows DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Registry Installation

title: Windows DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Registry Installation
id: be0acb55-2695-4edf-bd1e-21b250a5dc89
related:
  - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
    type: derived
  - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
    type: derived
  - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags installation of a DNS ServerLevelPluginDll by matching a registry value whose TargetObject ends with \services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll. Attackers can use this setting to load attacker-controlled code by installing a malicious plugin DLL, typically requiring a DNS server restart to take effect. It relies on registry set telemetry that records the TargetObject path for the written value.
references:
  - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
  - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_dns_server_level_plugin_dll.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1574.001
  - attack.t1112
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: registry_set
detection:
  selection:
    TargetObject|endswith: \services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1