Windows: dnscmd.exe installs DNS ServerLevelPluginDll via /serverlevelplugindll

title: "Windows: dnscmd.exe installs DNS ServerLevelPluginDll via /serverlevelplugindll"
id: 5e7084e3-379e-4f8b-be7a-8272e2fcf424
related:
  - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67
    type: derived
  - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9
    type: derived
  - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies when dnscmd.exe is used with the /serverlevelplugindll option during DNS configuration. Installing a ServerLevelPluginDll can allow an attacker to introduce code that runs in the context of the DNS server after a restart, enabling persistence and defense impairment. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the dnscmd.exe command line containing both /config and /serverlevelplugindll.
references:
  - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83
  - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dnscmd_install_new_server_level_plugin_dll.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-05-08
modified: 2023-02-05
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1574.001
  - attack.t1112
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \dnscmd.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - /config
      - /serverlevelplugindll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1