Windows File Drop Indicators for Pingback Backdoor (updata.exe to oci.dll)

Alerts on updata.exe creating or modifying C:\Windows\oci.dll as a Pingback backdoor file indicator.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: Windows File Drop Indicators for Pingback Backdoor (updata.exe to oci.dll)
id: 1d89169c-72e0-48d4-8b8b-6c56410ce5e9
related:
  - id: 35a7dc42-bc6f-46e0-9f83-81f8e56c8d4b
    type: similar
  - id: b2400ffb-7680-47c0-b08a-098a7de7e7a9
    type: similar
  - id: 2bd63d53-84d4-4210-80ff-bf0658f1bf78
    type: derived
status: test
description: "This rule flags a specific Windows file creation or modification pattern associated with the Pingback backdoor: an executable named updata.exe writing a DLL at C:\\Windows\\oci.dll. Such behavior matters because placing or updating system-path components can support stealthy execution and persistence mechanisms for C2 tooling. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that records process image names and target filenames."
references:
  - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/backdoor-at-the-end-of-the-icmp-tunnel
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/4a54c651-b70b-4b72-84d7-f34d301d6406
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Malware/Pingback/file_event_win_malware_pingback_backdoor.yml
author: Bhabesh Raj, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-05-05
modified: 2023-02-17
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1574.001
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_event
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: updata.exe
    TargetFilename: C:\Windows\oci.dll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

What it detects

This rule flags a specific Windows file creation or modification pattern associated with the Pingback backdoor: an executable named updata.exe writing a DLL at C:\Windows\oci.dll. Such behavior matters because placing or updating system-path components can support stealthy execution and persistence mechanisms for C2 tooling. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that records process image names and target filenames.

Known false positives

  • Unlikely

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.