Windows File Event Indicators for CrackMapExec HackTool Artifacts
Flags Windows file creation in C:\Windows\Temp\ with filenames and patterns associated with CrackMapExec artifacts.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-file-event-indicators-for-crackmapexec-hacktool-artifacts-736ffa74
title: Windows File Event Indicators for CrackMapExec HackTool Artifacts
id: f8bb5185-6bd7-4421-ae2f-f12c84a5f06b
related:
- id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
type: obsolete
- id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows file creation activity where the target filename starts in C:\Windows\Temp\ and ends with specific PowerShell script names or matches known CrackMapExec-style output filename patterns. Attackers may drop transient scripts and tool-generated artifacts into this directory to support credential access workflows and remote execution. It relies on Windows file event telemetry containing the full target filename to match hardcoded path and filename patterns.
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_crackmapexec_indicators.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-03-11
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_path:
TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\Temp\
selection_names_str:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- \temp.ps1
- \msol.ps1
selection_names_re:
- TargetFilename|re: \\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$
- TargetFilename|re: \\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$
condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_names_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule identifies Windows file creation activity where the target filename starts in C:\Windows\Temp\ and ends with specific PowerShell script names or matches known CrackMapExec-style output filename patterns. Attackers may drop transient scripts and tool-generated artifacts into this directory to support credential access workflows and remote execution. It relies on Windows file event telemetry containing the full target filename to match hardcoded path and filename patterns.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.