Windows File Events: CrackMapExec or Impacket-secretsdump Credential Dumping Temp Output
Alerts on Windows temp file creations consistent with CrackMapExec or Impacket-secretsdump credential dumping activity.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-file-events-crackmapexec-or-impacket-secretsdump-credential-dumping-temp-6e2a900a
title: "Windows File Events: CrackMapExec or Impacket-secretsdump Credential Dumping Temp Output"
id: 61d855f3-a59a-426e-941e-682b1a0409e4
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows file creation events where the target filename matches the typical temp naming pattern used during remote credential dumping workflows. Attackers commonly use tools such as CrackMapExec or Impacket-secretsdump to collect credential material from remote systems, and the resulting files can expose that activity. The detection relies on file event telemetry for TargetFilename matching the specified pattern and the associated process image ending in \svchost.exe.
references:
- https://github.com/Porchetta-Industries/CrackMapExec
- https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ff8c200fd040b04d3b5ff05449646737f836235d/examples/secretsdump.py
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_remote_cred_dump.yml
author: SecurityAura, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-11-16
modified: 2024-06-27
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \svchost.exe
TargetFilename|re: \\Windows\\System32\\[a-zA-Z0-9]{8}\.tmp$
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows file creation events where the target filename matches the typical temp naming pattern used during remote credential dumping workflows. Attackers commonly use tools such as CrackMapExec or Impacket-secretsdump to collect credential material from remote systems, and the resulting files can expose that activity. The detection relies on file event telemetry for TargetFilename matching the specified pattern and the associated process image ending in \svchost.exe.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.