Windows Script Dropped by Signed Applications and LOLBINs
Detects Windows legitimate/signed executables dropping script files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, etc.) to disk, indicating potential script-based abuse.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_event
- Author
- frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-08-21
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags file creation events where specific Windows executables write script and script-like files to disk, including .bat, .ps1, .js/.hta, and other script project/workflow extensions. Such behavior can indicate malware staging or abuse of trusted binaries to execute or deliver code via on-disk scripts. It relies on Windows file event telemetry capturing the creating process image path and the target filename on disk.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
- dmpdump.github.iohttps://dmpdump.github.io/posts/TelegramRat/
- virustotal.comhttps://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a0d5b30578acd1df9139e7a8a4bfc659dc2cf48f4dc0c5804b70890adeb9fa21/behavior
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_script.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Script Dropped by Signed Applications and LOLBINs
id: f16a5953-5806-4085-b638-d1dacc0de7a3
status: test
description: This rule flags file creation events where specific Windows executables write script and script-like files to disk, including .bat, .ps1, .js/.hta, and other script project/workflow extensions. Such behavior can indicate malware staging or abuse of trusted binaries to execute or deliver code via on-disk scripts. It relies on Windows file event telemetry capturing the creating process image path and the target filename on disk.
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
- https://dmpdump.github.io/posts/TelegramRat/
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a0d5b30578acd1df9139e7a8a4bfc659dc2cf48f4dc0c5804b70890adeb9fa21/behavior
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_script.yml
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2026-05-11
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \eqnedt32.exe
- \wordpad.exe
- \wordview.exe
- \certutil.exe
- \certoc.exe
- \CertReq.exe
- \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
- \esentutl.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \AcroRd32.exe
- \RdrCEF.exe
- \hh.exe
- \finger.exe
TargetFilename|endswith:
- .bat
- .chm
- .csproj
- .hta
- .js
- .jse
- .proj
- .ps1
- .py
- .scf
- .vbe
- .vbs
- .wsf
- .wsh
filter_main_mshta:
Image|endswith: \mshta.exe
TargetFilename|endswith: .hta
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_script/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
type: derived