Windows File Write by Common Executables to Uncommon Locations
Alerts when selected Windows binaries write files to typically uncommon directories such as Temp, ProgramData, AppData, or system areas.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_event
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-12-10
- Updated
- 2026-10-19
ATT&CK techniques
Defense Evasion → C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies file events where specific Windows executables (including common Office components and LOLBIN-style downloaders) write any file into locations that are atypical for normal application storage, such as system paths, Temp, ProgramData, user profile directories, and startup-related folders. Attackers may abuse trusted binaries to drop payloads or downloaded files into these areas to blend in with legitimate activity and evade simpler detection. It relies on Windows file event telemetry, matching both the writing process image name and the target filename path contents.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v4- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-10-19
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows File Write by Common Executables to Uncommon Locations
id: 326486f2-9fe3-4bfc-8bc3-395092df61ec
related:
- id: 2ddef153-167b-4e89-86b6-757a9e65dcac
type: similar
- id: 1cf465a1-2609-4c15-9b66-c32dbe4bfd67
type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule identifies file events where specific Windows executables (including common Office components and LOLBIN-style downloaders) write any file into locations that are atypical for normal application storage, such as system paths, Temp, ProgramData, user profile directories, and startup-related folders. Attackers may abuse trusted binaries to drop payloads or downloaded files into these areas to blend in with legitimate activity and evade simpler detection. It relies on Windows file event telemetry, matching both the writing process image name and the target filename path contents.
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/#/download
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-12-10
modified: 2026-10-14
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection_img:
Image|endswith:
- \eqnedt32.exe
- \wordpad.exe
- \wordview.exe
- \cmdl32.exe
- \certutil.exe
- \certoc.exe
- \CertReq.exe
- \bitsadmin.exe
- \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
- \esentutl.exe
- \expand.exe
- \extrac32.exe
- \replace.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \ftp.exe
- \Ldifde.exe
- \RdrCEF.exe
- \hh.exe
- \finger.exe
- \findstr.exe
selection_locations:
TargetFilename|contains:
- :\Perflogs
- :\ProgramData\
- :\Temp\
- :\Users\Public\
- :\Windows\
- \$Recycle.Bin\
- \AppData\Local\
- \AppData\Roaming\
- \Contacts\
- \Desktop\
- \Favorites\
- \Favourites\
- \inetpub\wwwroot\
- \Music\
- \Pictures\
- \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
- \Users\Default\
- \Videos\
filter_optional_dell_techhub_repair:
Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe
TargetFilename|startswith:
- C:\Windows\System32\SRUDB_
- C:\Windows\System32\TEMPREPAIR
TargetFilename|endswith:
- .INTEG.RAW
- .EDB
filter_optional_dell_techhub_copy:
Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe
TargetFilename|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Dell\DTP\DB\SRUDBData\
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_in_uncommon_location/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1