Windows forfiles.exe Spawned cmd.exe from Non-System Location

Alerts on forfiles.exe running outside system paths and spawning cmd.exe with a forfiles-encoded command pattern.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2024-01-05
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036Masquerading
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process executions where forfiles.exe runs from a non-default location and spawns cmd.exe, with cmd.exe being named as \cmd.exe and launched using a command line that begins with /c echo ". The behavior matters because attackers can use forfiles to masquerade activity and indirectly execute commands from the current working directory. It relies on process creation telemetry including parent command line, parent image path, child image path, and child command line.

Reporting behind it

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Windows forfiles.exe Spawned cmd.exe from Non-System Location

Pivot detection · T1036 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-forfiles-exe-child-process-masquerading-via-cmd-exe-execution-f53714ec

title: Windows forfiles.exe Spawned cmd.exe from Non-System Location
id: 674ce959-e329-4d8d-8c9c-9cedef5eff34
status: test
description: This rule flags process executions where forfiles.exe runs from a non-default location and spawns cmd.exe, with cmd.exe being named as \cmd.exe and launched using a command line that begins with /c echo ". The behavior matters because attackers can use forfiles to masquerade activity and indirectly execute commands from the current working directory. It relies on process creation telemetry including parent command line, parent image path, child image path, and child command line.
references:
  - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/12/31/1-little-known-secret-of-forfiles-exe/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_forfiles_child_process_masquerading.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Anish Bogati, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-01-05
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1036
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentCommandLine|endswith:
      - .exe
      - .exe"
    Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
    CommandLine|startswith: /c echo "
  filter_main_parent_not_sys:
    ParentImage|contains:
      - :\Windows\System32\
      - :\Windows\SysWOW64\
    ParentImage|endswith: \forfiles.exe
    Image|contains:
      - :\Windows\System32\
      - :\Windows\SysWOW64\
    Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: f53714ec-5077-420e-ad20-907ff9bb2958
    type: derived

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