Windows Hacktool Execution via PE Metadata Company Field

Flags execution of Windows binaries with PE Company metadata set to "Cube0x0", even when renamed.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2022-04-27
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Resource Dev → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process executions where the PE header Company value matches Cube0x0. Attackers commonly embed distinctive metadata in compiled binaries, so renamed files can still be attributed via their PE fields. It relies on Windows process creation telemetry that includes parsed PE metadata such as the Company value.

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Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.