Windows HH.exe Process Execution with Suspicious Command-Line Paths
Alerts on HH.exe execution where the command line references temp, downloads, Outlook, or other writable directories.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-hh-exe-process-execution-with-suspicious-command-line-paths-e8a95b5e
title: Windows HH.exe Process Execution with Suspicious Command-Line Paths
id: 01098c90-7fc4-438f-aada-7dd7bc97f269
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where the image is Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe) and the command line includes common user-writable and staging locations. Attackers often use HH.exe to execute payloads or proxy execution from temporary/download and Outlook-related directories, making this activity high-risk despite a legitimate file name. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable name/path and the full command line.
references:
- https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/
- https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7
- https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/
- https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hh_susp_execution.yml
author: Maxim Pavlunin, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-04-01
modified: 2023-04-12
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.initial-access
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
- attack.t1218
- attack.t1218.001
- attack.t1218.010
- attack.t1218.011
- attack.t1566
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- OriginalFileName: HH.exe
- Image|endswith: \hh.exe
selection_paths:
CommandLine|contains:
- .application
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \Content.Outlook\
- \Downloads\
- \Users\Public\
- \Windows\Temp\
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where the image is Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe) and the command line includes common user-writable and staging locations. Attackers often use HH.exe to execute payloads or proxy execution from temporary/download and Outlook-related directories, making this activity high-risk despite a legitimate file name. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable name/path and the full command line.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.