Windows: ie4uinit.exe Used from Non-Standard Current Directory

Flags ie4uinit.exe runs whose CurrentDirectory is outside expected system paths, indicating potential LOLBIN misuse.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-05-07
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

Detects execution of ie4uinit.exe (or binaries with OriginalFileName IE4UINIT.EXE) when the process current directory is not a typical Windows system path. Attackers can abuse this signed living-off-the-land binary to run actions using a prepared ie4uinit.inf from an unexpected location. The rule relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable name and the process current directory.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: ie4uinit.exe Used from Non-Standard Current Directory

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-ie4uinit-exe-executed-from-unusual-currentdirectory-invalid-path-d3bf399f

title: "Windows: ie4uinit.exe Used from Non-Standard Current Directory"
id: 8b72843b-1ec3-4484-8255-8c7b6de76eae
status: test
description: Detects execution of ie4uinit.exe (or binaries with OriginalFileName IE4UINIT.EXE) when the process current directory is not a typical Windows system path. Attackers can abuse this signed living-off-the-land binary to run actions using a prepared ie4uinit.inf from an unexpected location. The rule relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable name and the process current directory.
references:
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/
  - https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_ie4uinit.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-05-07
modified: 2022-05-16
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  lolbin:
    - Image|endswith: \ie4uinit.exe
    - OriginalFileName: IE4UINIT.EXE
  filter_correct:
    CurrentDirectory:
      - c:\windows\system32\
      - c:\windows\sysWOW64\
  filter_missing:
    CurrentDirectory: null
  condition: lolbin and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
  - ViberPC updater calls this binary with the following commandline "ie4uinit.exe -ClearIconCache"
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: d3bf399f-b0cf-4250-8bb4-dfc192ab81dc
    type: derived

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