Windows Image Load: MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll Linked to Azure Browser SSO OAuth Token Requests
Alerts on MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll loads on Windows, with process-based exclusions, as a signal for potential Azure Browser SSO token activity.
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windows-image-load-microsoftaccounttokenprovider-dll-linked-to-azure-browser-sso-50f852e6
title: "Windows Image Load: MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll Linked to Azure Browser SSO OAuth Token Requests"
id: 1290b3a9-e0e6-4c3a-baab-8dd99684209a
status: test
description: This rule flags a DLL load event for C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll, excluding cases where common BackgroundTaskHost, developer tools, browsers, Edge components, and OneDrive executables are involved. Since this component participates in Azure AD browser SSO flows, an attacker can leverage token-related behavior to authenticate to Azure AD from the browser as the Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user. Telemetry required is Windows image/DLL load events that include the loaded DLL path and the loading process image path, enabling the rule’s include/exclude logic.
references:
- https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_azure_microsoft_account_token_provider_dll_load.yml
author: Den Iuzvyk, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-07-15
modified: 2023-04-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded: C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll
filter_main_bgtaskhost:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Windows\System32\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
Image|endswith: \BackgroundTaskHost.exe
filter_optional_devenv:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\
Image|endswith: \IDE\devenv.exe
filter_optional_ie:
Image:
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
- C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
filter_optional_edge_1:
- Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\
- Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe
- Image:
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
filter_optional_edge_2:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\
- C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\
Image|endswith:
- \msedge.exe
- \msedgewebview2.exe
filter_optional_onedrive:
Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe
filter_optional_null:
Image: null
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags a DLL load event for C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll, excluding cases where common BackgroundTaskHost, developer tools, browsers, Edge components, and OneDrive executables are involved. Since this component participates in Azure AD browser SSO flows, an attacker can leverage token-related behavior to authenticate to Azure AD from the browser as the Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user. Telemetry required is Windows image/DLL load events that include the loaded DLL path and the loading process image path, enabling the rule’s include/exclude logic.
Known false positives
- False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.