Windows ImageLoad of SVR GraphicalProton Backdoor DLL Names
Flags Windows DLL loads matching known GraphicalProton/SVR DLL filename suffixes.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-imageload-of-svr-graphicalproton-backdoor-dll-names-e64c8ef3
title: Windows ImageLoad of SVR GraphicalProton Backdoor DLL Names
id: 5a892d2a-8511-4066-8963-af05f6bd4c42
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows processes that load a set of specific DLL filenames associated with the GraphicalProton backdoor naming used by SVR. Loading these known DLLs can indicate malicious execution or persistence through DLL-based behavior. The detection relies on image-load telemetry that records the full DLL path and matches it by filename suffix.
references:
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2023/TA/Cozy-Bear/image_load_apt_cozy_bear_graphical_proton_dlls.yml
author: CISA, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-12-18
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- \AclNumsInvertHost.dll
- \AddressResourcesSpec.dll
- \BlendMonitorStringBuild.dll
- \ChildPaletteConnected.dll
- \DeregisterSeekUsers.dll
- \HandleFrequencyAll.dll
- \HardSwapColor.dll
- \LengthInMemoryActivate.dll
- \ModeBitmapNumericAnimate.dll
- \ModeFolderSignMove.dll
- \ParametersNamesPopup.dll
- \PerformanceCaptionApi.dll
- \ScrollbarHandleGet.dll
- \UnregisterAncestorAppendAuto.dll
- \WowIcmpRemoveReg.dll
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e64c8ef3-9f98-40c8-b71e-96110991cb4c
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies Windows processes that load a set of specific DLL filenames associated with the GraphicalProton backdoor naming used by SVR. Loading these known DLLs can indicate malicious execution or persistence through DLL-based behavior. The detection relies on image-load telemetry that records the full DLL path and matches it by filename suffix.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.