Windows: Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) and hamakaze.exe Execution

Alerts on KDU/hamakaze.exe launches with command-line parameters associated with kernel driver loading.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2026-01-02
Updated: 2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation where the executable image ends with \\kdu.exe or hamakaze.exe and the command line contains KDU-specific options. KDU is used to interact with kernel driver loading mechanics, which can enable execution of unauthorized drivers and undermine security controls. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including the executable image path/name and the full command line arguments.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) and hamakaze.exe Execution

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-kernel-driver-utility-kdu-and-hamakaze-exe-execution-e76ca062

title: "Windows: Kernel Driver Utility (KDU) and hamakaze.exe Execution"
id: fc9571ae-b1b8-4d5b-a58d-2a92aaf5c92d
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process creation where the executable image ends with \\kdu.exe or hamakaze.exe and the command line contains KDU-specific options. KDU is used to interact with kernel driver loading mechanics, which can enable execution of unauthorized drivers and undermine security controls. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including the executable image path/name and the full command line arguments.
references:
  - https://github.com/h4rmy/KDU
  - https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_kdu_driver_tool.yml
author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress), Huntrule Team
date: 2026-01-02
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
        - \kdu.exe
        - \hamakaze.exe
    - OriginalFileName: hamakaze.exe
  selection_cli_suspicious:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - "-map "
      - "-prv "
      - "-dse "
      - "-ps "
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate driver development, testing, or administrative troubleshooting (e.g., enabling/disabling hardware)
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_kdu_driver_tool/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: e76ca062-4de0-4d79-8d90-160a0d335eca
    type: derived

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