Windows Malicious Driver Load Identified by Known Bad Driver File Names
Alerts when Windows loads a driver whose file name matches a curated list of known malicious/suspicious drivers.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- driver_load
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-10-03
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows driver loads when the loaded image path ends with a filename from a hardcoded set of known malicious driver names. Loading a malicious or vulnerable driver can provide attackers with persistence and/or elevated privileges by executing code in kernel mode. Telemetry relies on driver-load events that provide the loaded image path or filename (ImageLoaded).
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Malicious Driver Load Identified by Known Bad Driver File Names
id: 0aff679d-fc86-4367-8a29-67e764c01921
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows driver loads when the loaded image path ends with a filename from a hardcoded set of known malicious driver names. Loading a malicious or vulnerable driver can provide attackers with persistence and/or elevated privileges by executing code in kernel mode. Telemetry relies on driver-load events that provide the loaded image path or filename (ImageLoaded).
references:
- https://loldrivers.io/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_win_mal_drivers_names.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-10-03
modified: 2023-12-02
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1543.003
- attack.t1068
logsource:
product: windows
category: driver_load
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- \wfshbr64.sys
- \ktmutil7odm.sys
- \ktes.sys
- \a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys
- \kt2.sys
- \4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys
- \malicious.sys
- \a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys
- \spwizimgvt.sys
- \c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys
- \fur.sys
- \wantd.sys
- \windbg.sys
- \4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys
- \gmer64.sys
- \1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys
- \poortry2.sys
- \wintapix.sys
- \daxin_blank6.sys
- \6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys
- \blacklotus_driver.sys
- \air_system10.sys
- \dkrtk.sys
- \7.sys
- \sense5ext.sys
- \ktgn.sys
- \ndislan.sys
- \nlslexicons0024uvn.sys
- \be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys
- \4.sys
- \wantd_2.sys
- \e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys
- \daxin_blank3.sys
- \gftkyj64.sys
- \daxin_blank2.sys
- \wantd_4.sys
- \reddriver.sys
- \834761775.sys
- \mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys
- \mjj0ge.sys
- \daxin_blank.sys
- \daxin_blank5.sys
- \poortry1.sys
- \msqpq.sys
- \mimidrv.sys
- \e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys
- \prokiller64.sys
- \nodedriver.sys
- \wantd_3.sys
- \lctka.sys
- \kapchelper_x64.sys
- \daxin_blank4.sys
- \a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys
- \wantd_6.sys
- \ntbios.sys
- \wantd_5.sys
- \pciecubed.sys
- \mimikatz.sys
- \nqrmq.sys
- \2.sys
- \poortry.sys
- \ntbios_2.sys
- \fgme.sys
- \telephonuafy.sys
- \typelibde.sys
- \daxin_blank1.sys
- \ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys
- \5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version.
- If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible)
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 39b64854-5497-4b57-a448-40977b8c9679
type: derived