Windows DLL sideloading via unsigned mfdetours.dll loaded by image_load
Alerts on loading unsigned \mfdetours.dll, consistent with DLL sideloading abuse via mftrace.exe.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- image_load
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-08-11
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies attempts to load a DLL named mfdetours.dll when the DLL is not located in a trusted Windows Kits path and is not marked as having a valid signature. Attackers can abuse mftrace.exe to attach to an arbitrary process and force loading of mfdetours.dll from the current execution directory, enabling stealthy execution or persistence. The detection relies on Windows image load telemetry and DLL signature status, along with the observed DLL load path.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows DLL sideloading via unsigned mfdetours.dll loaded by image_load
id: 46cd69d5-ded5-4467-8e2a-d35f51468733
related:
- id: d2605a99-2218-4894-8fd3-2afb7946514d
type: similar
- id: 948a0953-f287-4806-bbcb-3b2e396df89f
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies attempts to load a DLL named mfdetours.dll when the DLL is not located in a trusted Windows Kits path and is not marked as having a valid signature. Attackers can abuse mftrace.exe to attach to an arbitrary process and force loading of mfdetours.dll from the current execution directory, enabling stealthy execution or persistence. The detection relies on Windows image load telemetry and DLL signature status, along with the observed DLL load path.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_mfdetours_unsigned.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-08-11
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith: \mfdetours.dll
filter_main_legit_path:
ImageLoaded|contains: :\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\10\bin\
SignatureStatus: Valid
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1