Windows msdt.exe Creating Files in Suspicious Directories
Alerts when msdt.exe writes files to high-suspicion directories that may indicate persistence after exploitation.
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windows-msdt-exe-creating-files-in-suspicious-directories-318557a5
title: Windows msdt.exe Creating Files in Suspicious Directories
id: 98fad3f4-b5e2-44a5-b690-b98b9ef3fe6a
status: test
description: This rule flags activity where msdt.exe creates files under directories commonly associated with user startup, public persistence, or diagnostic/storage locations. Such file creation from a diagnostic troubleshooter binary can indicate attempts to persist or execute follow-on stages after exploitation. It relies on Windows file event telemetry capturing the executing process path (ending in \msdt.exe) and the target filename paths created.
references:
- https://irsl.medium.com/the-trouble-with-microsofts-troubleshooters-6e32fc80b8bd
- https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/30/guidance-for-cve-2022-30190-microsoft-support-diagnostic-tool-vulnerability/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_msdt_susp_directories.yml
author: Vadim Varganov, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-08-24
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- cve.2022-30190
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \msdt.exe
TargetFilename|contains:
- \Desktop\
- \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
- C:\PerfLogs\
- C:\ProgramData\
- C:\Users\Public\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 318557a5-150c-4c8d-b70e-a9910e199857
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags activity where msdt.exe creates files under directories commonly associated with user startup, public persistence, or diagnostic/storage locations. Such file creation from a diagnostic troubleshooter binary can indicate attempts to persist or execute follow-on stages after exploitation. It relies on Windows file event telemetry capturing the executing process path (ending in \msdt.exe) and the target filename paths created.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.