Windows NetExec Execution Indicators via PyInstaller _MEI Temp File Drops
Flags Windows file creation under Temp\_MEI* where NetExec nxc data files are dropped, indicating likely NetExec execution.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-netexec-execution-indicators-via-pyinstaller-mei-temp-file-drops-efc21479
title: Windows NetExec Execution Indicators via PyInstaller _MEI Temp File Drops
id: ca3cb196-a3ec-4dc1-88b3-c8099e7a17d9
status: experimental
description: This rule identifies on-disk indicators consistent with NetExec (nxc.exe) execution by matching newly created file paths under a PyInstaller extraction directory in the Windows Temp folder. It relies on file event telemetry and looks for file locations containing the NetExec embedded data directory name and the extracted _MEI* directory structure, including the unique "\nxc\data\" subdirectory. These file artifacts are important because attackers may attempt to run NetExec for AD enumeration and related post-exploitation activity, leaving distinct execution artifacts on the host.
references:
- https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
- https://www.netexec.wiki/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2026-04-08
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1021.002
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
- Image|contains: \nxc-windows-latest\
- TargetFilename|contains|all:
- \Temp\_MEI
- \nxc\data\
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3
type: derived
What it detects
This rule identifies on-disk indicators consistent with NetExec (nxc.exe) execution by matching newly created file paths under a PyInstaller extraction directory in the Windows Temp folder. It relies on file event telemetry and looks for file locations containing the NetExec embedded data directory name and the extracted _MEI* directory structure, including the unique "\nxc\data\" subdirectory. These file artifacts are important because attackers may attempt to run NetExec for AD enumeration and related post-exploitation activity, leaving distinct execution artifacts on the host.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.