Windows: Netsh helper DLL registration via suspicious registry paths
Flags Netsh helper DLL registration when the DLL path is found in suspicious user/temp-like registry details on Windows.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- registry_set
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-11-28
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Persistence → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies registry writes under the NetSh key where a new DLL value is pointed to a location commonly abused for persistence. Attackers may register a Netsh helper DLL stored in user-writable or temporary directories to ensure it is loaded by a trusted Windows component. The detection relies on registry set telemetry capturing the target key path and the DLL location string present in the event details.
Reporting behind it
- ired.teamhttps://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll
- pentestlab.bloghttps://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_netsh_help_dll_persistence_susp_location.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: Netsh helper DLL registration via suspicious registry paths"
id: 777552e9-d281-48db-b005-523d5517b596
related:
- id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452
type: similar
- id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1
type: similar
- id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies registry writes under the NetSh key where a new DLL value is pointed to a location commonly abused for persistence. Attackers may register a Netsh helper DLL stored in user-writable or temporary directories to ensure it is loaded by a trusted Windows component. The detection relies on registry set telemetry capturing the target key path and the DLL location string present in the event details.
references:
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll
- https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_netsh_help_dll_persistence_susp_location.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1546.007
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_target:
TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh
selection_folders_1:
Details|contains:
- :\Perflogs\
- :\Users\Public\
- :\Windows\Temp\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \Temporary Internet
selection_folders_2:
- Details|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \Favorites\
- Details|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \Favourites\
- Details|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \Contacts\
- Details|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \Pictures\
condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1