Windows: Network connections initiated to api.mega.co.nz or mega.nz

Identifies initiated Windows outbound connections to api.mega.co.nz/mega.nz for potential file-transfer staging.

FreeReviewedSigma · Low · v2
Product
windows
Category
network_connection
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2021-12-06
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies outbound network connections marked as initiated by a Windows process to domains ending with mega.co.nz or mega.nz. Such connectivity can be abused by attackers to access file-sharing infrastructure for staging, exchanging, or retrieving payloads. It relies on network connection telemetry that includes an initiated flag and destination hostname to match the specified domain suffixes.

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Windows: Network connections initiated to api.mega.co.nz or mega.nz
Pivot detection · T1567.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.