Windows Suspicious Non-Browser Network Connections to Google API Endpoints
Alerts on suspicious Windows processes connecting to Google API hostnames, excluding common browsers and known benign apps.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- network_connection
- Author
- Gavin Knapp (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2023-05-01
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies network connections from non-browser Windows processes to common Google API domains such as drive.googleapis.com, oauth2.googleapis.com, sheets.googleapis.com, and www.googleapis.com. Such traffic from unexpected binaries may indicate covert command-and-control or automation using Google-hosted services. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry that includes destination hostname and the connecting process image path, using allowlisting for common browsers and related executables to reduce false positives.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/looCiprian/GC2-sheet
- youtu.behttps://youtu.be/n2dFlSaBBKo
- services.google.comhttps://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/gcat_threathorizons_full_apr2023.pdf
- tanium.comhttps://www.tanium.com/blog/apt41-deploys-google-gc2-for-attacks-cyber-threat-intelligence-roundup/
- bleepingcomputer.comhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-command-and-control-red-team-tool-in-attacks/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_domain_google_api_non_browser_access.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Suspicious Non-Browser Network Connections to Google API Endpoints
id: 60e7bcc1-edb3-4588-b399-eaa7e1746591
status: experimental
description: This rule identifies network connections from non-browser Windows processes to common Google API domains such as drive.googleapis.com, oauth2.googleapis.com, sheets.googleapis.com, and www.googleapis.com. Such traffic from unexpected binaries may indicate covert command-and-control or automation using Google-hosted services. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry that includes destination hostname and the connecting process image path, using allowlisting for common browsers and related executables to reduce false positives.
references:
- https://github.com/looCiprian/GC2-sheet
- https://youtu.be/n2dFlSaBBKo
- https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/gcat_threathorizons_full_apr2023.pdf
- https://www.tanium.com/blog/apt41-deploys-google-gc2-for-attacks-cyber-threat-intelligence-roundup/
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-command-and-control-red-team-tool-in-attacks/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_domain_google_api_non_browser_access.yml
author: Gavin Knapp, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-05-01
modified: 2025-02-22
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1102
logsource:
product: windows
category: network_connection
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- drive.googleapis.com
- oauth2.googleapis.com
- sheets.googleapis.com
- www.googleapis.com
filter_optional_brave:
Image|endswith: \brave.exe
filter_optional_chrome:
Image|endswith:
- :\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
- :\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
filter_optional_google_drive:
Image|contains: :\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\
Image|endswith: \GoogleDriveFS.exe
filter_optional_firefox:
Image|endswith:
- :\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe
- :\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe
filter_optional_ie:
Image|endswith:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
- :\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
filter_optional_maxthon:
Image|endswith: \maxthon.exe
filter_optional_edge_1:
- Image|contains: :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\
- Image|endswith:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- :\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
- \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe
filter_optional_edge_2:
Image|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\
- :\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\
Image|endswith:
- \msedge.exe
- \msedgewebview2.exe
filter_optional_opera:
Image|endswith: \opera.exe
filter_optional_safari:
Image|endswith: \safari.exe
filter_optional_seamonkey:
Image|endswith: \seamonkey.exe
filter_optional_vivaldi:
Image|endswith: \vivaldi.exe
filter_optional_whale:
Image|endswith: \whale.exe
filter_optional_googleupdate:
Image|endswith: \GoogleUpdate.exe
filter_optional_outlook_exe:
Image|endswith: \outlook.exe
filter_main_null:
Image: null
filter_main_empty:
Image: ""
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate applications communicating with the "googleapis.com" endpoints that are not already in the exclusion list. This is environmental dependent and requires further testing and tuning.
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 7e9cf7b6-e827-11ed-a05b-0242ac120003
type: derived