Windows Office Applications Loading VBE DLLs (VBA Runtime Indicators)

Flags Office apps loading VBA-related VBE DLLs, a strong indicator of VBA macro execution.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: Windows Office Applications Loading VBE DLLs (VBA Runtime Indicators)
id: cd5277e3-9748-4c5f-a7e6-01f5c4ede788
status: test
description: This rule matches DLL load events where common Microsoft Office executables (EXCEL, OUTLOOK, POWERPNT, WINWORD, MSPUB, ONENOTE) load VBE-related DLLs such as VBE7.DLL, VBEUI.DLL, and VBE7INTL.DLL. Because these DLLs are part of the VBA runtime/editor components, their presence during Office execution can indicate VBA macro activity. The detection relies on image-load telemetry that records the loaded DLL path alongside the parent process image name on Windows.
references:
  - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_office_vbadll_load.yml
author: Antonlovesdnb, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-02-19
modified: 2023-02-10
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \excel.exe
      - \mspub.exe
      - \onenote.exe
      - \onenoteim.exe
      - \outlook.exe
      - \powerpnt.exe
      - \winword.exe
    ImageLoaded|endswith:
      - \VBE7.DLL
      - \VBEUI.DLL
      - \VBE7INTL.DLL
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule matches DLL load events where common Microsoft Office executables (EXCEL, OUTLOOK, POWERPNT, WINWORD, MSPUB, ONENOTE) load VBE-related DLLs such as VBE7.DLL, VBEUI.DLL, and VBE7INTL.DLL. Because these DLLs are part of the VBA runtime/editor components, their presence during Office execution can indicate VBA macro activity. The detection relies on image-load telemetry that records the loaded DLL path alongside the parent process image name on Windows.

Known false positives

  • Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.