Windows PowerShell execution via obfuscated cmdstdin input (Event ID 4697)
Alerts on service creation events that run PowerShell through cmd with stdin-style obfuscation markers.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-powershell-execution-via-obfuscated-cmdstdin-input-event-id-4697-0c718a5e
title: Windows PowerShell execution via obfuscated cmdstdin input (Event ID 4697)
id: ab8abae0-89f5-4ed7-95c3-ef38015daf5c
related:
- id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002
type: derived
- id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows security events where a service installation (Event ID 4697) references cmd invoking PowerShell with indicators of stdin-style input obfuscation. Attackers can use this pattern to conceal execution parameters while still launching PowerShell for follow-on activity. The detection relies on audit telemetry from Security logs capturing the ServiceFileName content used during service creation.
references:
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_invoke_obfuscation_stdin_services_security.yml
author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-15
modified: 2022-11-29
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- cmd
- powershell
selection2:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- ${input}
- noexit
selection3:
ServiceFileName|contains:
- " /c "
- " /r "
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows security events where a service installation (Event ID 4697) references cmd invoking PowerShell with indicators of stdin-style input obfuscation. Attackers can use this pattern to conceal execution parameters while still launching PowerShell for follow-on activity. The detection relies on audit telemetry from Security logs capturing the ServiceFileName content used during service creation.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.