Windows Network Connections Initiated by PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe)
Flags outbound network connections initiated by PowerShell on Windows, excluding common local and private IP ranges.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- network_connection
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2017-03-13
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule identifies network connections with Initiated set to true where the process image ends with powershell.exe or pwsh.exe. Such behavior is commonly used by malicious scripts to retrieve additional payloads or communicate with command and control over external IPs and uncommon network paths. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry that includes the initiating process image and destination IP, and it applies exclusions for local/private address ranges and specific IP CIDR ranges to reduce noise.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Network Connections Initiated by PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe)
id: b4f7c92c-e724-4182-bc2a-401745f07f57
status: test
description: This rule identifies network connections with Initiated set to true where the process image ends with powershell.exe or pwsh.exe. Such behavior is commonly used by malicious scripts to retrieve additional payloads or communicate with command and control over external IPs and uncommon network paths. It relies on Windows network connection telemetry that includes the initiating process image and destination IP, and it applies exclusions for local/private address ranges and specific IP CIDR ranges to reduce noise.
references:
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DLtJTxMWZ2o
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_powershell_network_connection.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-03-13
modified: 2024-03-13
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
Initiated: "true"
filter_main_local_ip:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- 127.0.0.0/8
- 10.0.0.0/8
- 169.254.0.0/16
- 172.16.0.0/12
- 192.168.0.0/16
- ::1/128
- fe80::/10
- fc00::/7
User|contains:
- AUTHORI
- AUTORI
filter_main_msrange:
DestinationIp|cidr:
- 20.184.0.0/13
- 51.103.210.0/23
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Administrative scripts
- Microsoft IP range
- Additional filters are required. Adjust to your environment (e.g. extend filters with company's ip range')
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 1f21ec3f-810d-4b0e-8045-322202e22b4b
type: derived