Windows PrivateLog Image Load: svchost.exe loading clfsw32.dll

Alert on svchost.exe loading clfsw32.dll, a rarely observed Windows image load pattern consistent with PRIVATELOG.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: "Windows PrivateLog Image Load: svchost.exe loading clfsw32.dll"
id: 7c5ee44f-2e3a-461b-96aa-e0cbf8744a9f
status: test
description: This rule flags a specific Windows image load sequence where svchost.exe loads clfsw32.dll. The behavior matters because atypical module loading by a system host process can indicate stealth tooling using rarely seen execution patterns. It relies on telemetry that records the initiating image path (Image) and the loaded module path (ImageLoaded).
references:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20210901184449/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/09/unknown-actor-using-clfs-log-files-for-stealth.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/PRIVATELOG/image_load_usp_svchost_clfsw32.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-09-07
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1055
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \svchost.exe
    ImageLoaded|endswith: \clfsw32.dll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Rarely observed
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 33a2d1dd-f3b0-40bd-8baf-7974468927cc
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags a specific Windows image load sequence where svchost.exe loads clfsw32.dll. The behavior matters because atypical module loading by a system host process can indicate stealth tooling using rarely seen execution patterns. It relies on telemetry that records the initiating image path (Image) and the loaded module path (ImageLoaded).

Known false positives

  • Rarely observed

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.