Windows Process Access: PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS Granted to Uncommon Target Image
Alerts on Windows events granting PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS to processes with uncommon target image filenames.
FreeUnreviewedSigmalowv1
windows-process-access-process-all-access-granted-to-uncommon-target-image-a24e5861
title: "Windows Process Access: PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS Granted to Uncommon Target Image"
id: 022b4db6-1993-46c8-a38e-daf1aec436ce
status: test
description: This rule flags process access requests where the target executable path ends with a set of uncommon Windows tools and the granted access mask equals 0x1FFFFF (PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS). Attackers may request full access to a process to manipulate, inspect, or stage further actions, making these events high-signal for potential privilege escalation or stealthy tampering. It relies on Windows process access telemetry that records the target image path and the granted access mask.
references:
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_all_access_uncommon_target.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2024-05-27
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055.011
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith:
- \calc.exe
- \calculator.exe
- \mspaint.exe
- \notepad.exe
- \ping.exe
- \wordpad.exe
- \write.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1FFFFF"
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: a24e5861-c6ca-4fde-a93c-ba9256feddf0
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags process access requests where the target executable path ends with a set of uncommon Windows tools and the granted access mask equals 0x1FFFFF (PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS). Attackers may request full access to a process to manipulate, inspect, or stage further actions, making these events high-signal for potential privilege escalation or stealthy tampering. It relies on Windows process access telemetry that records the target image path and the granted access mask.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.