Windows Process Creation: cscript/wscript Register-App.vbs COM+ Registration
Alert on cscript/wscript running “.vbs -register” to register COM+ components, potentially leveraging register_app.vbs.
FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
windows-process-creation-cscript-wscript-register-app-vbs-com-registration-28c8f68b
title: "Windows Process Creation: cscript/wscript Register-App.vbs COM+ Registration"
id: 5bace648-a57a-4cfd-bdef-8e2b8dd27214
status: test
description: This rule flags executions of cscript.exe or wscript.exe running a VBS file with the command-line pattern “.vbs -register”. It targets attempts to register COM+ providers via register_app.vbs, which can enable attackers to set up malicious component loading for persistence or execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the process image name and command-line content.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1456613494783160325?s=20
- https://github.com/microsoft/Windows-classic-samples/blob/7cbd99ac1d2b4a0beffbaba29ea63d024ceff700/Samples/Win7Samples/winbase/vss/vsssampleprovider/register_app.vbs
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolscript_register_app.yml
author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-11-05
modified: 2022-07-07
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
- OriginalFileName:
- cscript.exe
- wscript.exe
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: ".vbs -register "
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Other VB scripts that leverage the same starting command line flags
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 28c8f68b-098d-45af-8d43-8089f3e35403
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags executions of cscript.exe or wscript.exe running a VBS file with the command-line pattern “.vbs -register”. It targets attempts to register COM+ providers via register_app.vbs, which can enable attackers to set up malicious component loading for persistence or execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the process image name and command-line content.
Known false positives
- Other VB scripts that leverage the same starting command line flags
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.