Windows Process Creation: Detects Specific Forest Blizzard Tool Execution via Hashes and Batch/Schtasks Patterns
Detects suspicious Windows process execution tied to known hashes or schtasks/PowerShell command-line patterns used for staging and compression.
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windows-process-creation-detects-specific-forest-blizzard-tool-execution-via-has-07db928c
title: "Windows Process Creation: Detects Specific Forest Blizzard Tool Execution via Hashes and Batch/Schtasks Patterns"
id: e060e418-b441-4c53-84d7-8039795c9675
status: experimental
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events that match either one of two specific SHA256 hashes or a targeted execution pattern involving schtasks.exe creating/deleting tasks in the Microsoft\Windows\WinSrv path. It also detects PowerShell command lines that perform file discovery, write a .save artifact, and compress output to C:\ProgramData\ using Compress-Archive. Such behavior matters because attackers may stage, persist, and archive data using batch scripts, scheduled tasks, and PowerShell-based collection. Telemetry relies on Windows process creation details including process image path, full command line, and SHA256 file hash when available.
references:
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/04/22/analyzing-forest-blizzards-custom-post-compromise-tool-for-exploiting-cve-2022-38028-to-obtain-credentials/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2024/TA/Forest-Blizzard/proc_creation_win_apt_forest_blizzard_activity.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2024-04-23
modified: 2025-01-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- detection.emerging-threats
- attack.stealth
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_hashes:
Hashes|contains:
- SHA256=6b311c0a977d21e772ac4e99762234da852bbf84293386fbe78622a96c0b052f
- SHA256=c60ead92cd376b689d1b4450f2578b36ea0bf64f3963cfa5546279fa4424c2a5
selection_schtasks_create:
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Create
- /RU
- SYSTEM
- \Microsoft\Windows\WinSrv
CommandLine|contains:
- servtask.bat
- execute.bat
- doit.bat
selection_schtasks_delete:
Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Delete
- "/F "
- \Microsoft\Windows\WinSrv
selection_powershell:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- Get-ChildItem
- .save
- Compress-Archive -DestinationPath C:\ProgramData\
condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 07db928c-8632-488e-ac7d-3db847489175
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events that match either one of two specific SHA256 hashes or a targeted execution pattern involving schtasks.exe creating/deleting tasks in the Microsoft\Windows\WinSrv path. It also detects PowerShell command lines that perform file discovery, write a .save artifact, and compress output to C:\ProgramData\ using Compress-Archive. Such behavior matters because attackers may stage, persist, and archive data using batch scripts, scheduled tasks, and PowerShell-based collection. Telemetry relies on Windows process creation details including process image path, full command line, and SHA256 file hash when available.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.