Windows Process Creation: Executable Extension Masquerading with .exe After Decoy Extension
Alerts on Windows processes whose paths/command lines use misleading double extensions ending in .exe to cloak executable execution.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-process-creation-executable-extension-masquerading-with-exe-after-decoy--1cdd9a09
title: "Windows Process Creation: Executable Extension Masquerading with .exe After Decoy Extension"
id: 316345da-49c3-4b5a-b5c4-77d85ee65032
related:
- id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c
type: similar
- id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8
type: derived
status: stable
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the executable Image path ends with deceptive extension patterns such as .pdf.exe, .txt.exe, or .docx.exe, as well as variants using underscores or multiple spaces before .exe. Attackers use this masquerading to disguise an executable payload as a document or media file in spear-phishing and social engineering. Detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically matching the process Image end-of-string and the CommandLine contents for those extension patterns.
references:
- https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html
- https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_double_extension.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-06-26
modified: 2025-05-30
tags:
- attack.initial-access
- attack.t1566.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- " .exe"
- ______.exe
- .doc.exe
- .doc.js
- .docx.exe
- .docx.js
- .gif.exe
- .jpeg.exe
- .jpg.exe
- .mkv.exe
- .mov.exe
- .mp3.exe
- .mp4.exe
- .pdf.exe
- .pdf.js
- .png.exe
- .ppt.exe
- .ppt.js
- .pptx.exe
- .pptx.js
- .rtf.exe
- .rtf.js
- .svg.exe
- .txt.exe
- .txt.js
- .xls.exe
- .xls.js
- .xlsx.exe
- .xlsx.js
- ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- " .exe"
- ______.exe
- .doc.exe
- .doc.js
- .docx.exe
- .docx.js
- .gif.exe
- .jpeg.exe
- .jpg.exe
- .mkv.exe
- .mov.exe
- .mp3.exe
- .mp4.exe
- .pdf.exe
- .pdf.js
- .png.exe
- .ppt.exe
- .ppt.js
- .pptx.exe
- .pptx.js
- .rtf.exe
- .rtf.js
- .svg.exe
- .txt.exe
- .txt.js
- .xls.exe
- .xls.js
- .xlsx.exe
- .xlsx.js
- ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the executable Image path ends with deceptive extension patterns such as .pdf.exe, .txt.exe, or .docx.exe, as well as variants using underscores or multiple spaces before .exe. Attackers use this masquerading to disguise an executable payload as a document or media file in spear-phishing and social engineering. Detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically matching the process Image end-of-string and the CommandLine contents for those extension patterns.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.