Windows Process Creation: Explorer Command Lines with Unicode Whitespace Padding and '#'
Alerts when Explorer spawns a process with command lines containing long Unicode whitespace padding followed by '#'.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-11-04
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process is Explorer and the command line contains a '#' character while also including unusually long sequences of whitespace characters (including Unicode space variants). Attackers can use whitespace padding to visually obscure the meaningful portion of a command, helping conceal malicious instructions during user interaction. The detection relies on process creation telemetry with parent image context and command-line strings that preserve Unicode whitespace and punctuation.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Explorer Command Lines with Unicode Whitespace Padding and '#'"
id: d820704e-7f93-4b1c-b21f-7efd7662ad8a
related:
- id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
type: similar
- id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
type: similar
- id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the parent process is Explorer and the command line contains a '#' character while also including unusually long sequences of whitespace characters (including Unicode space variants). Attackers can use whitespace padding to visually obscure the meaningful portion of a command, helping conceal malicious instructions during user interaction. The detection relies on process creation telemetry with parent image context and command-line strings that preserve Unicode whitespace and punctuation.
references:
- https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
- https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_clickfix_filefix_whitespace_padding.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-11-04
modified: 2025-11-26
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1027.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_explorer:
ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe
CommandLine|contains: "#"
selection_space_variation:
CommandLine|contains:
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- " "
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1