Windows Process Creation: File Upload Clickfix Lure via Browser to Command Execution
Alerts when browser-launched processes include clickfix-style command markers plus tool and captcha-related terms on Windows.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-process-creation-file-upload-clickfix-lure-via-browser-to-command-execut-b5b29e4e
title: "Windows Process Creation: File Upload Clickfix Lure via Browser to Command Execution"
id: f6dfe5a3-48a3-46da-8c32-b485bcbf1365
related:
- id: 4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70
type: similar
- id: 4be03877-d5b6-4520-85c9-a5911c0a656c
type: obsolete
- id: b5b29e4e-31fa-4fdf-b058-296e7a1aa0c2
type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags Windows process creation where the parent process is a common web browser (Brave/Chrome/Firefox/Edge) and the spawned command line contains the '#' character, suggesting a browser file-upload dialog clickfix-style paste trick. It further requires the child command line to include one of several common command-line utilities or scripting tools and to include at least one human-verification/captcha/challenge-related term. This pattern matters because attackers can use social engineering to induce users to trigger execution of malicious download-and-run commands, and the detection relies on process parent/child command-line telemetry from Windows.
references:
- https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
- https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
- https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/filefix-the-new-social-engineering-attack-building-on-clickfix-tested-in-the-wild/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_filefix_execution_pattern.yml
author: 0xFustang, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-11-24
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204.004
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_exec_parent:
ParentImage|endswith:
- \brave.exe
- \chrome.exe
- \firefox.exe
- \msedge.exe
CommandLine|contains: "#"
selection_cli_lolbin:
CommandLine|contains:
- "%comspec%"
- bitsadmin
- certutil
- cmd
- cscript
- curl
- finger
- mshta
- powershell
- pwsh
- regsvr32
- rundll32
- schtasks
- wget
- wscript
selection_cli_captcha:
CommandLine|contains:
- account
- anti-bot
- botcheck
- captcha
- challenge
- confirmation
- fraud
- human
- identification
- identificator
- identity
- robot
- validation
- verification
- verify
condition: selection_exec_parent and 1 of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of PowerShell or other utilities launched from browser extensions or automation tools
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation where the parent process is a common web browser (Brave/Chrome/Firefox/Edge) and the spawned command line contains the '#' character, suggesting a browser file-upload dialog clickfix-style paste trick. It further requires the child command line to include one of several common command-line utilities or scripting tools and to include at least one human-verification/captcha/challenge-related term. This pattern matters because attackers can use social engineering to induce users to trigger execution of malicious download-and-run commands, and the detection relies on process parent/child command-line telemetry from Windows.
Known false positives
- Legitimate use of PowerShell or other utilities launched from browser extensions or automation tools
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.