Windows Process Creation: .NET ETW Logging Environment Variables Set via Command Line

Flags process command lines setting COMPlus_ETWEnabled/COMPlus_ETWFlags, potentially impairing ETW logging for .NET.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2020-05-02
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule matches Windows process creation events whose command line contains the .NET runtime environment configuration variables COMPlus_ETWEnabled and COMPlus_ETWFlags. An attacker may use these runtime configuration knobs to influence ETW logging behavior in .NET processes as part of defense evasion. The detection relies on process creation telemetry with command-line content.

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Windows Process Creation: .NET ETW Logging Environment Variables Set via Command Line
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.