huntrule

Windows Process Creation: Renamed AutoHotkey Executable via PE Metadata

Detects renamed AutoHotkey executables by correlating process creation events with PE metadata indicators.

FreeUnreviewedSigmamediumv1
title: "Windows Process Creation: Renamed AutoHotkey Executable via PE Metadata"
id: 6bb6f4a9-64a0-426f-9755-e6b800d475c0
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process executions where the PE metadata fields indicate an AutoHotkey binary (matching product/description and original file name), even when the image path suggests the executable has been renamed. Attackers may rename legitimate-looking components to evade simple allowlists and make process monitoring less obvious. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including the executable image path and PE metadata fields such as Product, Description, and OriginalFileName.
references:
  - https://www.autohotkey.com/download/
  - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/02/06/collect-exfiltrate-sleep-repeat/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_autohotkey.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Huntrule Team
date: 2023-02-07
tags:
  - attack.stealth
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    - Product|contains: AutoHotkey
    - Description|contains: AutoHotkey
    - OriginalFileName:
        - AutoHotkey.exe
        - AutoHotkey.rc
  filter:
    - Image|endswith:
        - \AutoHotkey.exe
        - \AutoHotkey32.exe
        - \AutoHotkey32_UIA.exe
        - \AutoHotkey64.exe
        - \AutoHotkey64_UIA.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyA32.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyA32_UIA.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyU32.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyU32_UIA.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyU64.exe
        - \AutoHotkeyU64_UIA.exe
    - Image|contains: \AutoHotkey
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0f16d9cf-0616-45c8-8fad-becc11b5a41c
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process executions where the PE metadata fields indicate an AutoHotkey binary (matching product/description and original file name), even when the image path suggests the executable has been renamed. Attackers may rename legitimate-looking components to evade simple allowlists and make process monitoring less obvious. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including the executable image path and PE metadata fields such as Product, Description, and OriginalFileName.

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.