huntrule

Windows process activity matching Winnti malware traits from ProgramData\DRM paths

Detects suspicious Winnti-like execution where ProgramData\DRM processes spawn specific child binaries with known parent path patterns.

FreeReviewedSigma · Critical · v5
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2020-02-01
Updated
2026-07-31
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows process creation events that match a set of specific parent/child process path patterns tied to Winnti malware behavior. Attackers can use these staged executable names and locations under ProgramData\DRM to persist, execute, and blend in with legitimate system activity. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, including ParentImage and Image full paths, to match the exact path-based characteristics.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1574.001 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Service DLL Hijack of IKEEXT or PrintNotify
Malicious PowerShell Spawned by Masqueraded NVIDIA GeForce Experience Binary
Suspicious msimg32.dll Loaded from Non-System Directory
DLL Side-Loading via Signed Binary Loading Known Malicious Helper DLL
Suspicious DLL Sideloading via msdtc oci.dll Install (via process_creation)
Suspicious wmicodegen.dll Sideload by inetinfo.exe (UAT-8099 Cobalt Strike)
Suspicious LucidRook DismCore.dll Side-Load into Browser Process
Suspicious Encrypted Implant File Creation for DLL Search Order Hijacking (RainyDay Turian PlugX)
Suspicious RoboForm Signed Binary Executed From Non-Standard Path (via process_creation)
Windows process activity matching Winnti malware traits from ProgramData\DRM paths
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
  1. v5
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v4
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  3. v3
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  4. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  5. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.