Windows Process Creation: rundll32/cmd.exe Indicators of RedMimicry Winnti HackTool Execution

Flags rundll32.exe/cmd.exe launches with Winnti-specific DLL and temp batch indicators.

FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
title: "Windows Process Creation: rundll32/cmd.exe Indicators of RedMimicry Winnti HackTool Execution"
id: c2519257-5f0a-48cd-88b6-13a9e35e243d
status: test
description: This rule identifies Windows process creation events where rundll32.exe or cmd.exe is launched with command-line indicators consistent with executing specific DLL names and a batch file in a temporary path. Such activity can reflect attacker tooling or post-compromise execution patterns that rely on running embedded components and transient scripts. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including the process image path and full command line.
references:
  - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_redmimicry_winnti_playbook.yml
author: Alexander Rausch, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2023-03-01
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1106
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1218.011
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: process_creation
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \rundll32.exe
      - \cmd.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - gthread-3.6.dll
      - \Windows\Temp\tmp.bat
      - sigcmm-2.4.dll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 95022b85-ff2a-49fa-939a-d7b8f56eeb9b
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule identifies Windows process creation events where rundll32.exe or cmd.exe is launched with command-line indicators consistent with executing specific DLL names and a batch file in a temporary path. Such activity can reflect attacker tooling or post-compromise execution patterns that rely on running embedded components and transient scripts. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including the process image path and full command line.

Known false positives

  • Unknown

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.