Windows Process Creation: SharpView.exe Recon and Discovery Commands Execution
Alerts when SharpView.exe runs with command-line indicators of AD and network discovery/enumeration activity.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-process-creation-sharpview-exe-recon-and-discovery-commands-execution-b2317cfa
title: "Windows Process Creation: SharpView.exe Recon and Discovery Commands Execution"
id: 7473aeec-e499-42bb-a0ef-86cbf1bea6f7
related:
- id: dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa
type: similar
- id: b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events on Windows where the executable SharpView.exe is run and the command line contains one or more SharpView/PowerView-style discovery or enumeration cmdlets. Attackers commonly use these commands to gather information about Active Directory objects, trust relationships, network shares, RDP/DFS session details, and related environment configuration to support further targeting. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the original image name/path and specific command-line substrings.
references:
- https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/
- https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-4---system-discovery-using-sharpview
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_sharpview.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-12-10
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1049
- attack.t1069.002
- attack.t1482
- attack.t1135
- attack.t1033
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- OriginalFileName: SharpView.exe
- Image|endswith: \SharpView.exe
- CommandLine|contains:
- Add-RemoteConnection
- Convert-ADName
- ConvertFrom-SID
- ConvertFrom-UACValue
- Convert-SidToName
- Export-PowerViewCSV
- Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier
- Find-DomainProcess
- Find-DomainShare
- Find-DomainUserEvent
- Find-DomainUserLocation
- Find-ForeignGroup
- Find-ForeignUser
- Find-GPOComputerAdmin
- Find-GPOLocation
- Find-Interesting
- Find-LocalAdminAccess
- Find-ManagedSecurityGroups
- Get-CachedRDPConnection
- Get-DFSshare
- Get-DomainComputer
- Get-DomainController
- Get-DomainDFSShare
- Get-DomainDNSRecord
- Get-DomainFileServer
- Get-DomainForeign
- Get-DomainGPO
- Get-DomainGroup
- Get-DomainGUIDMap
- Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup
- Get-DomainObject
- Get-DomainOU
- Get-DomainPolicy
- Get-DomainSID
- Get-DomainSite
- Get-DomainSPNTicket
- Get-DomainSubnet
- Get-DomainTrust
- Get-DomainUserEvent
- Get-ForestDomain
- Get-ForestGlobalCatalog
- Get-ForestTrust
- Get-GptTmpl
- Get-GroupsXML
- Get-LastLoggedOn
- Get-LoggedOnLocal
- Get-NetComputer
- Get-NetDomain
- Get-NetFileServer
- Get-NetForest
- Get-NetGPO
- Get-NetGroupMember
- Get-NetLocalGroup
- Get-NetLoggedon
- Get-NetOU
- Get-NetProcess
- Get-NetRDPSession
- Get-NetSession
- Get-NetShare
- Get-NetSite
- Get-NetSubnet
- Get-NetUser
- Get-PathAcl
- Get-PrincipalContext
- Get-RegistryMountedDrive
- Get-RegLoggedOn
- Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection
- Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn
- Get-WMIRegMountedDrive
- Get-WMIRegProxy
- Invoke-ACLScanner
- Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess
- Invoke-Kerberoast
- Invoke-MapDomainTrust
- Invoke-RevertToSelf
- Invoke-Sharefinder
- Invoke-UserImpersonation
- Remove-DomainObjectAcl
- Remove-RemoteConnection
- Request-SPNTicket
- Set-DomainObject
- Test-AdminAccess
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events on Windows where the executable SharpView.exe is run and the command line contains one or more SharpView/PowerView-style discovery or enumeration cmdlets. Attackers commonly use these commands to gather information about Active Directory objects, trust relationships, network shares, RDP/DFS session details, and related environment configuration to support further targeting. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, matching the original image name/path and specific command-line substrings.
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.