Windows Process Creation: Exchange Server Artifact Discovery and File Staging Patterns

Alerts on Exchange-focused suspicious Windows command-line activity involving dumping, temp file creation, and compression utilities.

FreeReviewedSigma · Critical · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2021-03-09
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1053Scheduled Task/Job
Persistence
- T1053Scheduled Task/Job
- T1546Event Triggered Execution
Priv Esc
- T1053Scheduled Task/Job
- T1546Event Triggered Execution
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events whose command lines and executable paths match a set of behaviors commonly used to stage and collect data on Exchange server hosts. It looks for combinations indicating attribute changes to web-accessible script content, scheduled task usage via VSPerfMon, creation of shadow-copy listings, and compression/minidump techniques (including makecab and comsvcs DLL minidumps). Telemetry relies on process creation details such as Image, ParentImage, and full CommandLine, including path fragments like inetpub\wwwroot and compression/minidump parameters.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1546 — drag to rearrange

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Windows Process Creation: Exchange Server Artifact Discovery and File Staging Patterns

Pivot detection · T1546 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-suspected-exchange-server-exploitation-via-file-temp-du-bbb2dedd

title: "Windows Process Creation: Exchange Server Artifact Discovery and File Staging Patterns"
id: fe4f05ff-14a7-4d06-a1b5-7f5d7cd28e5e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events whose command lines and executable paths match a set of behaviors commonly used to stage and collect data on Exchange server hosts. It looks for combinations indicating attribute changes to web-accessible script content, scheduled task usage via VSPerfMon, creation of shadow-copy listings, and compression/minidump techniques (including makecab and comsvcs DLL minidumps). Telemetry relies on process creation details such as Image, ParentImage, and full CommandLine, including path fragments like inetpub\wwwroot and compression/minidump parameters.
references:
  - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/
  - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
  - https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3
  - https://twitter.com/GadixCRK/status/1369313704869834753?s=20
  - https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/1372218235949617161
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/HAFNIUM/proc_creation_win_apt_hafnium.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-03-09
modified: 2023-03-09
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1546
  - attack.t1053
  - attack.g0125
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_attrib:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - attrib
      - " +h "
      - " +s "
      - " +r "
      - .aspx
  selection_vsperfmon:
    - Image|contains: \ProgramData\VSPerfMon\
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
        - schtasks
        - VSPerfMon
  selection_opera_1:
    Image|endswith: Opera_browser.exe
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \services.exe
      - \svchost.exe
  selection_opera_2:
    Image|endswith: Users\Public\opera\Opera_browser.exe
  selection_vssadmin:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - vssadmin list shadows
      - Temp\__output
  selection_makecab_1:
    Image|endswith: \makecab.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - inetpub\wwwroot\
      - .dmp.zip
  selection_makecab_2:
    Image|endswith: \makecab.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - Microsoft\Exchange Server\
      - compressionmemory
      - .gif
  selection_7zip:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " -t7z "
      - C:\Programdata\pst
      - \it.zip
  selection_rundll32:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - \comsvcs.dll
      - Minidump
      - "full "
      - \inetpub\wwwroot
  selection_other:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - Windows\Temp\xx.bat
      - Windows\WwanSvcdcs
      - Windows\Temp\cw.exe
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
    type: derived

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