Windows Process Creation: Suspected Exchange Server Exploitation via File/Temp Dump and Compression Commands

Alerts on Exchange-focused suspicious Windows command-line activity involving dumping, temp file creation, and compression utilities.

FreeUnreviewedSigmacriticalv1
title: "Windows Process Creation: Suspected Exchange Server Exploitation via File/Temp Dump and Compression Commands"
id: fe4f05ff-14a7-4d06-a1b5-7f5d7cd28e5e
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation where command lines and binaries align with common post-exploitation behaviors seen in Exchange server targeting, including creating/processing temporary files, dumping memory or data, and compressing output for exfiltration. It matters because attackers often use these actions to escalate access, persist, and package artifacts for later retrieval. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including Image and CommandLine content, plus parent process context for Opera-related suspicious activity.
references:
  - https://blog.truesec.com/2021/03/07/exchange-zero-day-proxylogon-and-hafnium/
  - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/
  - https://discuss.elastic.co/t/detection-and-response-for-hafnium-activity/266289/3
  - https://twitter.com/GadixCRK/status/1369313704869834753?s=20
  - https://twitter.com/BleepinComputer/status/1372218235949617161
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/TA/HAFNIUM/proc_creation_win_apt_hafnium.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-03-09
modified: 2023-03-09
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1546
  - attack.t1053
  - attack.g0125
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_attrib:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - attrib
      - " +h "
      - " +s "
      - " +r "
      - .aspx
  selection_vsperfmon:
    - Image|contains: \ProgramData\VSPerfMon\
    - CommandLine|contains|all:
        - schtasks
        - VSPerfMon
  selection_opera_1:
    Image|endswith: Opera_browser.exe
    ParentImage|endswith:
      - \services.exe
      - \svchost.exe
  selection_opera_2:
    Image|endswith: Users\Public\opera\Opera_browser.exe
  selection_vssadmin:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - vssadmin list shadows
      - Temp\__output
  selection_makecab_1:
    Image|endswith: \makecab.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - inetpub\wwwroot\
      - .dmp.zip
  selection_makecab_2:
    Image|endswith: \makecab.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - Microsoft\Exchange Server\
      - compressionmemory
      - .gif
  selection_7zip:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " -t7z "
      - C:\Programdata\pst
      - \it.zip
  selection_rundll32:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - \comsvcs.dll
      - Minidump
      - "full "
      - \inetpub\wwwroot
  selection_other:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - Windows\Temp\xx.bat
      - Windows\WwanSvcdcs
      - Windows\Temp\cw.exe
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: bbb2dedd-a0e3-46ab-ba6c-6c82ae7a9aa7
    type: derived

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation where command lines and binaries align with common post-exploitation behaviors seen in Exchange server targeting, including creating/processing temporary files, dumping memory or data, and compressing output for exfiltration. It matters because attackers often use these actions to escalate access, persist, and package artifacts for later retrieval. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including Image and CommandLine content, plus parent process context for Opera-related suspicious activity.

Known false positives

  • Unlikely

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.