Windows ConHost Spawning Suspicious Script and Command-Line Child Processes
Flags conhost.exe spawning command/scripting utilities like PowerShell, MSHTA, or regsvr32.exe.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-02-05
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process creation events where conhost.exe spawns specific child executables associated with command execution and scripting, including cmd.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, PowerShell variants, regsvr32.exe, and wscript.exe. This matters because conhost.exe is a trusted Windows component that can be used to launch script or utility interpreters as part of stealthy execution chains. The detection relies on process creation telemetry containing parent and child process image paths and, in some cases, original file names to match the invoked binaries.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows ConHost Spawning Suspicious Script and Command-Line Child Processes
id: a24079e2-8666-4737-8756-75b1de71e4b2
related:
- id: 7dc2dedd-7603-461a-bc13-15803d132355
type: similar
- id: dfa03a09-8b92-4d83-8e74-f72839b1c407
type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process creation events where conhost.exe spawns specific child executables associated with command execution and scripting, including cmd.exe, cscript.exe, mshta.exe, PowerShell variants, regsvr32.exe, and wscript.exe. This matters because conhost.exe is a trusted Windows component that can be used to launch script or utility interpreters as part of stealthy execution chains. The detection relies on process creation telemetry containing parent and child process image paths and, in some cases, original file names to match the invoked binaries.
references:
- https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_conhost_susp_winshell_child_process.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-02-05
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1202
- attack.t1218
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: \conhost.exe
selection_child:
- Image|endswith:
- \cmd.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \powershell_ise.exe
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- \regsvr32.exe
- \wscript.exe
- OriginalFileName:
- cmd.exe
- cscript.exe
- mshta.exe
- powershell_ise.exe
- powershell.exe
- pwsh.dll
- regsvr32.exe
- wscript.exe
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative tasks using `conhost.exe` to spawn child processes such as `cmd.exe`, `powershell.exe`, or `regsvr32.exe`.
level: high
license: DRL-1.1