Windows Process Creation: Potential Dridex-Related Execution via svchost/regsvr32 and Recon Tools
Alerts on suspicious svchost.exe or regsvr32.exe process executions with matching command-line and parent/child patterns indicative of Dridex activity.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2019-01-10
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → DiscoveryRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation patterns consistent with Dridex-like activity, focusing on execution chains involving svchost.exe or regsvr32.exe. It matches svchost.exe launching with user Desktop/AppData artifacts, or regsvr32.exe spawned by excel.exe with specific flags and temporary payload paths, and also looks for an unusual svchost.exe parent spawning whoami.exe and net/net1.exe with discovery-oriented arguments. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including Image, CommandLine, and ParentImage to correlate suspicious parent-child relationships and command-line indicators.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Potential Dridex-Related Execution via svchost/regsvr32 and Recon Tools"
id: 9bceff19-51a0-4ff4-a496-b3c200ec67e5
status: stable
description: This rule flags Windows process creation patterns consistent with Dridex-like activity, focusing on execution chains involving svchost.exe or regsvr32.exe. It matches svchost.exe launching with user Desktop/AppData artifacts, or regsvr32.exe spawned by excel.exe with specific flags and temporary payload paths, and also looks for an unusual svchost.exe parent spawning whoami.exe and net/net1.exe with discovery-oriented arguments. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including Image, CommandLine, and ParentImage to correlate suspicious parent-child relationships and command-line indicators.
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/993daa5e-112a-4ff6-8b5a-edbcec7c7ba3
- https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/dridex/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2019/Malware/Dridex/proc_creation_win_malware_dridex.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-01-10
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1135
- attack.t1033
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_svchost:
Image|endswith: \svchost.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- C:\Users\
- \Desktop\
filter_svchost:
ParentImage|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\
selection_regsvr:
ParentImage|endswith: \excel.exe
Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- " -s "
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
filter_regsvr:
CommandLine|contains: .dll
selection_anomaly_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: \svchost.exe
selection_anomaly_child_1:
Image|endswith: \whoami.exe
CommandLine|contains: " /all"
selection_anomaly_child_2:
Image|endswith:
- \net.exe
- \net1.exe
CommandLine|contains: " view"
condition: (selection_svchost and not filter_svchost) or (selection_regsvr and not filter_regsvr) or (selection_anomaly_parent and 1 of selection_anomaly_child_*)
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e
type: derived